




APR 1968



HEADQUARTERS
 3d Battalion, 3d Marines
 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF
 FPO San Francisco, California 96602

3/RFF/eam
 13130
 7 May 1968

From: Commanding Officer, 3d Battalion, 3d Marines
 To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A03D)
 Via: Commanding General, 3d Marine Division (Rein) FMF
 Commanding General, III MAF
 Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Command Chronology for period 1 April 68 - 30 April 68.

Ref: (a) MCO 5750.2A
 (b) FMFPacO 5750.8
 (c) DivO 5750.1A

Encl: ✓(1) April 1968 Command Chronology.

1. In accordance with reference (a), (b) and (c) enclosure (1) is submitted.
2. Group IV: Downgrade at three year intervals with declassification after twelve years. Declassified upon removal of enclosure.

DONALD C. MARCHETTE
 By direction

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HEADQUARTERS
3d Battalion, 3d Marines
3d Marine Division (Rein) FMP
FPO San Francisco, California 96602

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

1 April 1968 to 30 April 1968

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PART I

ORGANIZATIONAL DATA1. DESIGNATIONCOMMANDER

3d Battalion, 3d Marines

LtCol J. W. MARSH 1-30 April

Subordinate Units

H&S Company	Capt. T.W. ARNOLD	1-26 April
	1stLt P.B. CLONTZ	27-30 April
India Company	Capt. O.J. LEHRACK	1-30 April
Kilo Company	Capt. D.R. FRANK	1-30 April
Lima Company	Capt. F.R. MATTHEWS	1-30 April
Mike Company	Capt. W.H. MCADAMS	1-30 April

Attached Units

Whiskey Btry, 1st Bn, 12th Marines,	Capt. J.M. STRANK	1-30 April
3d Plt, Company "A", 3d Tank Bn,	GySgt J.R. McCELLAND	1-14 April
	1stLt J.E. McCOLLUM	14-30 April
Section, 2nd Plt, "A" Btry, 1st Bn,	ADA, AWSP 44th Arty, USA	
	1stLt T. LAMPE	1-27 April
	1stLt H.C. NELSON	27-30 April
Detachment, Sound Plt, "F" Btry, 2nd Bn, 26 Arty, USA		1-30 April
Detachment, "C" Co., 3rd Engineer Bn.		1-30 April

2. Location:

1-30 April, Quang Tri Province, YD 175723, (A-3), RVN.

3. Staff Officers:

Executive Officer	Major G. P. SLADE	1-30 April
S-1	1stLt D.C. MARCHETTE	1-30 April
S-2	1stLt A.L. ASHBURN	1-30 April
S-3	Major R.F. FINDLAY JR.	1-30 April
S-4	1stLt E.H. LAWRENCE	1-30 April

4. Average Monthly Strength.

<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>	
<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>
38	1054	2	56

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PART II

NARRATIVE SUMMARY

The reporting period commenced with the battalion making preparations for a major sweep and destroy operation in the Leatherneck Square area during the period 3-8 April 68. A detailed account of the operation is forwarded by enclosure (1). Significant contact was gained on two occasions in the course of the operation. On the evening of 5 April a Company "L" ambush engaged an estimated NVA Company moving in column toward the company night defensive position. As the scope of the contact increased, the ambush was withdrawn and the enemy was heavily engaged from the perimeter and by artillery and mortar close defensive fires. The enemy attack was repulsed with only minor friendly casualties, while the enemy losses were estimated to be heavy. A search of the area, at first light, the following morning revealed 17 NVA, KIA's (confirmed), 4 WIA's POW's, 4 AK47's, 3 SKS Carbines and an impressive collection of enemy equipment and supplies. The second contact of consequence occurred on seizure of Battalion Objective #6 (YD 159651) on 6 April. Approximately 15 NVA defending the objective withdrew rapidly with the approach of Company "L". The objective was seized with limited opposition and rapidly consolidated. During the late afternoon, shortly after resupply was completed, the NVA delivered accurate 60mm mortar fire in the perimeter accounting for 2 friendly KIA's and 9 WIA's. The position was probed and subjected to harrassing enemy fires after dark on the 6th and 7th of April.

Contacts made by the Battalion during the operation other than those discussed above were frequent but of little consequence, and could not be described as conclusive and a total of 22 NVA, KIA were confirmed and 9 individual weapons captured. The battalion incurred 4 KIA, 20 WIA Med Evac and 13 WIA minor.

The battalion conducted a tactical movement to the Cam Lo Bridge on 8 April and boarded vehicles for transportation to Dong Ha. On 9 April Companies "I" and "M" returned by vehicle to the junction of Route #1 and Route 566 and completed a tactical movement to the A-3 Position to relieve Companies "K" and "M", 3/1, assigned to man the A-3 Position and Hill #28 in the absence of 3/3.

On 9 April OPCON of Company "K" was chopped to 3/4. Company "K" was assigned to the C-2 Position less one platoon which was subsequently chopped by 3/4 to 1/4 to man the C-2 Bridge Position. Company "K" with all platoons was chopped to the OPCON of 1/9 on 23 April. The entire company is presently assigned to the C-2 Position.

Company "L" was assigned to the OPCON 3rd Squadron, 5th Armored Cavalry, USA during the period 9-16 April.

While OPCON to 3/4, a Company "K" squad sized, killer team engaged an estimated NVA Company on 16 April and was subsequently reinforced

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by the remainder of Company "K" on 17 April. Twelve NVA, KIA's were confirmed and two individual weapons captured, while Company "K" suffered 5 KIA and 16 WIA, Med Evacs.

Other than indicated above contacts gained during this period in the A-3 AO were infrequent and of little consequence. Enemy movement appeared to be generally confined to the south and west.

Work is under way to convert the Company Strong Point located north of A-3 on Hill #28 to a platoon reinforced Combat Outpost, in order to make better use of available manpower, in conducting more aggressive operations. A major portion of the effort in connection was completed during this reporting period.

The combat readiness of the battalion has shown a marked increase as a result of an accelerated input of personnel and progress in the maintenance and supply areas. An accelerated training program is also expected to pay major dividends.

The battalion was ordered during the latter phases of the reporting period to propose an extended operation in the Leatherneck Square area in connection with the recent build up of NVA forces and 3rd Marine Division rice denial plan has been submitted and approved by CG, 3rd Marine Division and it is anticipated the operation will commence during the initial phases of the next reporting period.

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PART III

SEQUENTIAL LISTINGS OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS1. Combat Missions Assigned.

a. Basic Mission. To conduct missions in assigned area of operations in accordance with 3rd MarDiv Operation Order 59-67.

b. To conduct anti-filtration operations in AO with special emphasis on interdicting north/south infiltration routes. Assume responsibility for enlarged AO to include outpost of Hill #28. Defend and provide protection for construction effort on Route 566. Reference; 9th Marine Operation Plan 2-68; 9th Marine Frag Order #14, (Operation Kentucky).

c. Conduct a intensive search and destroy operation on a 2000 meter frontage from the west, from the 17 grid line from An Phu to the 65 grid line, placing maximum emphasis on the destruction of enemy positions and emplacements encountered. Reference: 9th Marines Frag Order 18 (Operation Kentucky). Battalion Frag Order 7-68.

d. On D-1 secure a patrol base at YD 188735 and conduct platoon size night ambushes at YD 185735 and YD 190738 prior to last light.

(1) Seize Objectives #1 at YD 197746 and #2 at YD 189747 with one (1) reinforced company each and conduct daylight search and attack patrols and daylight ambushes from these locations. Reference: Battalion Frag Order 8-68.

2. Significant Operations Conducted.

a. The Battalion (-) conducted a search and destroy operation in accordance with 9th Marines Frag Order #18 during the period 4-8 April 68. A After Action Report of the operation is included in Part IV with the supporting documents.

(1) 4 April 68 - At 1000H Company "I" seized Objective Jill with Company "K" moving up on the east flank. Company "K" engaged 8 NVA at YD 157694 with M-60's, mortars and artillery, after an air strike "I" swept through the area capturing one NVA pack. At 1530H elements of Company "L" received small arms fire from YD 157698. The company assaulted through a bunker complex which was concealed by heavy vegetation and captured one (1) NVA radio and one (1) NVA pack. The battalion set in for the night with no further sightings.

(2) 5 April 68 - At 0800H elements of Company "M" made contact with six (6) NVA at YD 158696 and killed two (2) of the enemy. At approximately the same time, Company "K" observed four (4) NVA in the same general area and engaged them with unknown results. (See supporting documents for list of captured gear).

The sweep continued throughout the day with several bunker complexes located and numerous enemy equipment found which is listed separately in Part IV of this chronology. The Battalion established two separate

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perimeters for the night due to the thick vegetation and the desirability of employing more night activities to cover the area. As Companies "M" and "L" were digging in their local security was engaged with small arms from a NVA unit at YD 171669. Positions were consolidated and night activities set in. Several ambushes reported movement around their positions and at 2330H a Company "L" ambush made contact with a unknown size enemy force at YD 168678. It was necessary for the ambush to fight its way back to the company perimeter.

(3) 6 April 68 - At 0001H a Company "K" ambush engaged a enemy unit and reported one (1) wounded approximately 25 meters from the position. At 0015H, the Company "K" ambush was heavily engaged and fought their way back to the company perimeter.

The Company "L" perimeter received a heavy ground attack which was broken with small arms and extremely close and accurate 81mm Mortar and artillery defensive fires. At 0645H Company "L" searched the battle area capturing 4 POW's and counting 17 NVA bodies. At 1600H while moving to seize the ground at YD 159651 Company "L" observed 16 NVA fleeing from the objective to the east. The NVA were pursued by small arms fire, artillery and fixed wing aircraft. The battalion received mortar fire on this ground while consolidating the position on two occasions at 1850H and 1930H. The mortar fire was extremely accurate and followed shortly after a helicopter resupply. At 2050H Company "K"'s local security received approximately 10 Chi Com grenades and at 2224H engaged an estimated 20 NVA with small arms.

(4) 7 April 68. - At 0800H the area of the Company "K" contact was searched and one AK47 rifle was captured along with other equipment. Throughout the remainder of the day numerous supply caches were discovered and destroyed. At 2055H a Company "K" listening post engaged a unknown size NVA force at YD 165658. At 2100H the battalion received numerous probes from the north and west. The probes were supported by 60mm mortars, Chi Com grenades and rifle grenades. The listening posts were pulled back into the perimeter and supporting fires called. Contact was broken after about one hour.

(5) 8 April 68. - Seizure of the remaining objectives was accomplished without incident and the operation secured at 1600H when the battalion entrucked at Cam Lo Bridge for Dong Ha.

3. Casualties Inflicted on the Enemy.

a. During the month of April, the 3rd Battalion, 3d Marines inflicted the following casualties on the enemy; 23 NVA KIA (confirmed) and 4 POW's.

4. Casualties Sustained.

a. Name of Surgeon: Lt. Walter F. Drysdale, MC, USNR, 1-8 April
Lt. Emilio Jiminez, MC, USNR 8-30 April

b. Significant Events:

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- (1) On 2 April, one member of H&S Company was an NBC from falling in a hole, possible fracture left leg.
- (2) On 4 April, one member of H&S Company was killed in action from enemy small arms fire, one Kit Carson Scout attached to Lima Company 3/3 was wounded from enemy mortars.
- (3) On 5 April, 3 members of Mike Company, 4 members of Lima Company were wounded in action from small arms fire. Also one member from Mike Company was killed in action at the same time. One member of Kilo Company was an NBC self inflicted wound. One dog handler from 3d MP Bn. attached to 3/3 was wounded from enemy small arms fire.
- (4) On 6 April, 17 members of Mike Company, 9 members of Lima Company, 3 members of Kilo Company, one member of H&S Company were wounded due to enemy mortars and Chi Coms; 2 members of H&S Company were killed in action due to enemy mortars and one member of "C" Company, 3d Engineers attached to 3/3 wounded from enemy mortars.
- (5) On 7 April, 5 members of India Company and one member of Mike Company was wounded due to enemy Chi Com grenades.
- (6) On 14 April, one member of India Company was wounded from enemy fire.
- (7) On 16 April, 3 members of Kilo Company were KIA'ed from enemy fire and Chi Coms; one member of Kilo Company was wounded from enemy fire.
- (8) On 17 April, 14 members of Kilo Company was wounded and two members of H&S Company was wounded from enemy mortars. Two members of Kilo Company were KIA's from enemy mortars.
- (9) On 23 April, one member of Lima Company non-hostile shrapnel wound of the left leg due to destroying enemy bunkers.
- (10) On 24 April, one member of Mike Company NBC self inflicted .45 wound, T&T abdomen.
- (11) On 29 April, one member of Mike Company was an NBC from a self inflicted M-16 wound, T&T left ankle.
- (12) On 30 April, one member of Kilo Company was wounded due to enemy artillery.

(13) Number of Battle Casualties:

TOTALS	KIA	WIA	DOW	MIA	NBC	NBC KILLED
USMC 3/3	8	60	0	0	5	0
USN 3/3	1	3	0	0	0	0
USMC OTHER	0	3	0	0	0	0

(14) There were a total of 1,268 inoculations given during the month of April.

(15) Outpatient Visits:

(a) Common Complaints;

(1) FUO	3
(2) Venereal Disease	5
(3) Heat Casualties	8
(4) Malaria	0
(5) Dental	57
(6) Cellulitis	22
(7) Diarrhea	23

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c. Medical Trends: There were 15 cases of dysentery with fever in Lima Company. The cause was fresh bread picked up at battalion rear when the company left for the forward area. The bread was not consumed immediately and was exposed to extreme temperature ranges.

d. Problem Areas: None

5. New Techniques Employed. None

6. Command Relations.

a. OPCON - 9th Marines, ADOCN - 3rd MarDiv

b. On 2 April 1968 assumed OPCON of Companies "K" and "M", 3d Bn, 1st Marines.

c. On 9 April 1968 Companies "K" & "M", 3d Bn, 1st Marines were chopped from OPCON to the 9th Marines.

d. On 9 April 1968 Company "K" chopped to OPCON 3d Bn, 4th Marines.

e. On 9 April 1968 Company "L" chopped to OPCON 3d Squadron, 5th Armored Cavalery, USA.

f. 16 April 1968, Company "L" chopped from OPCON 3d Squadron, 5th Armored Cavalery, USA to 3d Bn, 3d Marines.

7. Equipment. None

8. Logistics.

a. Supply:

(1) General: During this reporting period the battalion has continued to build up the A-3 Position. Daily resupply by helicopter is the principle means of transportation to A-3.

(2) Class I. A daily resupply maintains the regular supply of Class I at a three to five day level. Water buffalos are lifted in and out primarily by helicopter.

(3) Class II. There still remains a critical shortage on:
 Bayonets
 Gas masks and filters
 Magazines - .45
 Binoculars
 Salt tablets

(4) Class III. No problems encountered in keeping an adequate supply of POL on hand.

(5) Class IV. Due to Operation Dye Marker no problems have been encountered in obtaining Class IV items.

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(6) Class V. The battalion supply of Class V is maintained at a BA + 10 DOA.

b. Motor Transport.

(1) The present status is considered adequate for current operations on the M274A2's (mules), M422A1 (mites) and M37B1 (PC).

(a) Breakdown of M422A1 (mites)

(1) T/E	20
(2) O/H	14
(3) 2nd Echelon Maint.	0
(4) 3rd Echelon Maint.	1
(5) Code "X"ed	7
(6) Operational	12

(b) Breakdown of M274A2 (mules)

(1) T/E	30
(2) O/H	29
(3) 2nd Echelon Maint.	8
(4) 3rd Echelon Maint.	1
(5) Code "X"ed	1
(6) Operational	20

(c) A shortage of carburetors, magnetos, ignition kits, fuel pumps, rear cables and cable leads for the M274A2 (Mules) still exists in our motor transport section.

(2) Ninth Motor Transport Battalion provides trucks to pick up and deliver supplies to the ISA for helicopter resupply. On several occasions truck support has been inadequate.

c. Engineer Assistance.

(1) The 11th Engineers have provided assistance in landscaping and erected two watch towers at the A-3 Position.

(2) The 3rd Engineers have provided assistance by building a shower unit at A-3 Position. Also provided a bull dozer which was used to dig positions for the tank platoon, dig out and cover trash pits for the position.

d. Ordnance.

(1) At the end of the month the battalion maintained the following status:

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<u>ITEM</u>	<u>T/E</u>	<u>O/H</u>	<u>OPERATIONAL</u>	<u>2nd BCH.</u>	<u>3d BCH (PLSU)</u>
M-14 Rifles	52	52	52	0	0
45 Pistols	329	354	354	0	0
Shotguns	13	18	17	0	1
M-60 MG	35	31	31	0	0
106RR	8	8	7	0	1
M-79	36	38	38	0	0
81mm Mortars	8	8	8	0	2
60mm Mortars	12	12	11	0	1
3.5 Rocket	32	30	27	0	3
M-16 Rifles	919	996	996	0	5
106 RR Mounts	8	8	7	0	1
Flame Throwers	8	9	4	0	0

9. Civic Action. None

10. Administration.

a. An awards ceremony was held on the 27th of April. The below medals were presented to members of this battalion by Major General Tompkins, Commanding General, 3rd Marine Division.

2 Bronze Star Medals
1 Navy Commendation Medal
12 Purple Hearts

b. A total of 2 Court Martials were held during April; 2 SCM. Ten Court Martials are pending. Five Battalion Commanders Office Hours were completed and none are pending. There was 4 Company Commanders Office Hours completed and 20 are pending.

c. Special Services provided Stationary Kits, Game Kits, free beer and free soda during the month of April.

d. Post Exchange services were not available to the battalion due to it being located at A-3 however Sundries Packages were distributed.

e. Liberty was not authorized during this period.

f. During the month 9 Officers and 49 Enlisted Marines rotated to CONUS. Two Officers and 36 Enlisted were transferred as a result of medical evacuation. Thirty Seven enlisted Marines were transferred within the Regiment or Division.

11. Personnel.

a. Gains: 3 USMC OFF; 135 USMC ENL; 1 USN OFF; 5 USN ENL
b. Losses: 8 USMC OFF; 135 USMC ENL; 1 USN OFF; 9 USN ENL

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c. Monthly Strength (Average):

MC OFF	MC ENL	USN OFF	USN ENL
38	1054	2	56

d. Net loss/gain:

MC OFF	MC ENL	USN OFF	USN ENL
5/0	0/0	0/0	4/0

e. Emergency leave for the month of April; 1 USMC enlisted. There were no humanitarian transfers during the month of April. Twice/thrice wounded or reassigned outside of RVN due to father/ brother in country; 4 USMC enlisted.

f. There was one Hardship Discharge applied for during the past month. Three are pending.

g. Three Administrative Discharges are pending.

h. The R&R Program continues to be a major morale factor within this command. There were 73 out of country R&R quotas used and 13 in country quotas during this reporting period.

i. Morale is considered to be excellent to outstanding.

j. Postal Services during the month have been good. Mail was delivered to the forward position by air as available.

12. Intelligence.

During the month of April, 3rd Battalion, Third Marines participated in one operation at the start of the month. It lasted 5 days and took the battalion south of A-3 to Cam Lo. Contact was made on several occasions but they were all light contacts. There were a few other contacts throughout the month. All were minor contacts.

On the 4th of April, 3/3 started an operation in which they moved south from the trace to Cam Lo sweeping through the 15 and 16 grids. There was contact everyday but it was light. On one day 3/3 was hit by enemy mortars on two separate occasions. See Part IV for After Action Report, dated 12 April 68 for a day by day synopsis.

Company India on 14 April while running a patrol made contact at 1237H at (YD 198696). They engaged with small arms about 4 to 6 NVA. Contact was broken after a brief exchange of fire and at approximately 1300H Company India proceeded to check out the immediate area to exploit the contact. They found several fresh fighting holes and the remains of a claymore mine which was used during the contact. They also found various other gear.

On 16 April 68, at 0855H, Mike Company elements made contact with what appeared to be a dug in NVA squad. Contact was made at (YD 154701) while Mike Company's elements were moving to a daylight ambush site. Company Mike's elements engaged the enemy with small arms while the rest of the Company deployed to aid elements in contact. Artillery and 81's were employed. At 0910H, the NVA were spotted moving away from their position. Shortly afterwards Company Mike checked out the area and recovered one crew served weapon.

Company Lima on the 23rd of April 68 had elements of their company returning to the patrol base. At 0701H they observed 2 NVA at (YD 151706). They engaged the 2 NVA with small arms and M-79's. The NVA then fled to the east. The area was searched with negative results.

At 1445H on the 23rd of April 68, A-3 received 20 rounds of enemy artillery estimated to be 85mm caliber. The artillery came from an azimuth of 6100 mils. They impacted outside the perimeter at (YD 180719).

On 26 April 68 an India Company ambush at (YD 192734) engaged an undetermined number of NVA with small arms and M-79's. At 2020H the ambush continued to fire M-79's in the area of contact and received two Chi Com grenades. The area was kept under observation and searched at first light. They found one NVA KIA and captured a lot of gear.

This month we had no strong contacts. There were many light contacts with very small units. Enemy artillery and mortars has decreased this month. There was a lot of enemy movement in our area, however it was small units rather than large units. There were many spottings of 2 and 3 persons moving in our area. These were engaged by artillery, 81's, 4.2's and 106's and automatic weapons when possible. The incoming we received was generally off target.

ENEMY GEAR CAPTURED 1 -- 30 April 68

Hammocks	2	DH - 10 Mines	11
NVA Packs	28	French AT Mines	5
NVA Radio	1	RPG - 2 round	1
AK Magazines	9	7.62 Ammo/MG (rounds)	2200
Cartridge belts	3	Drum Magazines for MG	3
Chi Com grenades	32	RPG-2 charges	3
Gas Mask	1	E-Tools	3
Binoculars pair	1	60mm Mortar rounds	500/400w/fuses
Canteens	2	7.62 Rounds for AK's	1100
First Aid Kit	1	RPG-7 rounds/w fuses	150
Wallets	2	82mm rounds w/fuses	455
Mosquito Nets	3	Roll of Comm Wire	1
SKS's	4	Type 56, Light MG	1
AK-47's	6	Camouflage cover	1
Flashlights & Batteries	3	Blasting Caps, box	1
Radio Batteries	3	Detonators	20
Rope	1	Z-10 type mines	6
Bicycles	2	Chi Com grenade pouches	3

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Bandages	2	Camera	1
Documents	5	Magazine Pouch	1
Several bags of rice and much clothing, khaki uniform and civilian attire		Rice Bowls	2

13. Communications.

a. The Communications Platoon ran normal wire and radio operations at A-3. Each company was issued two PRC-6's in addition to their normal 11 radios for use in tying in their 60mm mortar positions. Four new radios were obtained (PRC-93) for use with TACP. They are single frequency UHF radios used to control fixed wing aircraft in the field. They are being tested in the field and so far have proved to be a very useful item. The Comm Officer rotated and was replaced by Lt. D.P. BARBIERO, 16 Apr.

b. Training. A contact team made up of the radio chief and a technician was organized to give a one hour class on radio procedure, maintenance and operation to all O311 radio operators in the line companies. In addition, lesson plans were submitted from radio, wire and TAC Party for a 3 hour class to all squad leaders and potential squad leaders. The class is scheduled in May.

c. Equipment Status. We received three new PRC 25's this month and 8 PRC-6's on a special allowance. We also received 4 PRC-93's and 64 new whip antennas. However, four PRC25's were dropped from our books. Essential gear down is as follows

2 PRC - 41
1 MRC - 83
1 PRC - 25

d. Problem Areas. Three radio operators joined the platoon this month and two O311's from Kilo Company have been assigned to the platoon for training as radio operators. This should totally alleviate our previous shortage of operators. One Corporal 2847 was transferred out of the Battalion leaving the battalion with one KY-8 technician. This man will rotate in June.

Tape antennas are still in barely adequate supply.

We are still 6 PRC-25's under our T/E and these are on order.

14. Weather. The weather during the month of April was warm and humid with a few light rains, the mornings were usually cool with a lot of morning mist and haze which disappeared by late morning.

Average High - 83 degrees	Humidity - 85%
Average Low - 70 degrees	Precipitation - .87 inches
Average Visibility - 5 miles	Wind 7 Knots from the north/west.

15. Fire Support. In April the artillery shot 4,900 rounds in support of 3/3. The support was excellent in most cases. During the operation

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Enclosure (1)

from 4 April thru 8 April 68, 1900 rounds were fired. Excellent results were had with close defensive fires. These were fired in every night and used every night either for protection or preps. The night of 5 April was notable in that over 500 rounds were fired all at close (under 200 meters from friendlies) range. Fires were used to break the force of contact and once this was done fires were refired all night to keep the NVA from policing the battle field. In the morning 17 bodies and 4 POW's were found along with numerous gear and weapons.

Excellent results also were had with adjusted preps which were then hit with TOT's. Massive preps were also fired unobserved on targets of an intelligence nature, however, the battalion was not convinced that this is the best way to prep an area.

Throughout the rest of the month preps were shot in a saturation pattern. That is many grids in a small area and hit for a given time frame. This technique was successful in the battalions AO because the battalion knew where to place most prep fires effectively.

On calls were planned more selectively than in previous months and the use of groups was cut down.

The observation towers increased visibility substantially and increased our use of general support, such as 8 inch and 175mm artillery. To date however, the battalion has been able to locate only one enemy artillery position.

a. Units Providing direct and General Support.

- (1) Btry "J", 2nd Bn, 12th Marines
- (2) Btry "E", 2nd Bn, 12th Marines
- (3) Btry "F", 2nd Bn, 12th Marines
- (4) Btry "C", 1st Bn, 40th Artillery, USA
- (5) Btry "K", 4th Bn, 13th Marines
- (6) Btry "L", 4th Bn, 12th Marines
- (7) Btry "M", 4th Bn, 12th Marines
- (8) Btry "W", 1st Bn, 12th Marines
- (9) Btry "W", 2nd Bn, 12th Marines
- (10) 1st 8", Howtizer Btry, 3rd MarDiv.
- (11) 3th Bn, 4th Artillery, USA

b. Missions Fired.

(1)	Suspected enemy positions	189
(2)	Prep Fires	92
(3)	Live Missions (NVA/VC in open)	55
(4)	Night defensive fires	20
(5)	Blocking Fires	12
(6)	Final protective fires	7
(7)	Counter battery	3
(8)	Marking rounds	3
(9)	Illumination	1
(10)	Recon by fire	1
(11)	H & I's requested	650

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(2) 81mm Mortars

(a)	Prep Fires	54
(b)	Targets of Opportunity	23
(c)	Counter Mortar	4
(d)	H & I Fires	287

c. Ammunition Expended.(1) Artillery

(a)	105mm	2,996
(b)	155mm	106
(c)	175mm	17
(d)	4.2mm	1,786
(e)	8"	20

(2) 81mm Mortars

(a)	HEM (new)	1,749
(b)	WP (new)	79
(c)	WP (old)	146
(d)	Illumination	23


16. Air Support.

- a. There were no airstrikes controlled by this station, however, AO's ran several strikes in our AO.
- b. There were 103 TPQ's requested by this battalion and 27 were hit.
- c. There were 18 Med Evacs run, evacuating 36 people.
- d. Two reconnaissance flights were requested and two received.
- e. There were no HU-1E gunships controlled by this battalion, however, AO's ran several flights in our AO.
- f. There were four AO flights requested plus the normal AO coverage in the area.
- g. Ten C&C flights were requested and nine (9) received.
- h. Helicopters lifted 634,153 pounds of cargo and 286 passengers for this battalion.

17. Activities/Deactivations/Resignations. None

18. Training Report. Maximum effort was made during the month of April to increase the quality and quantity of training. A classroom, bunker and small arms range were constructed in this connection. The primary objective was a through retraining of section, squad and team leaders in the basic concepts and techniques of tactics and weapons. Emphasis was placed on the responsibility of small unit leaders to train their

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men and a concerted effort was made to prepare them for this mission.

Five (5) hours of NBC instruction was given to a total of 132 Marines. Subjects included care and use of the field protective mask and the nature of various agents employed in NBC Warfare.

A machine gun school was organized to include three (3) separate blocks of instruction and provide a total of 21 hours of instruction to 245 Marines. Blocks of instruction included;

- a. Mechanical training and cycle of operation, malfunctions and stoppages and immediate action, mil relation and traversing and elevating mechanism.
- b. Tactical employment in the defense and offense.
- c. Techniques of fire. Instructions were equally divided among lecture, demonstration and application and a live firing exercise was included.

A 60mm mortar school gave 14 hours of instruction to 70 Marines. Classes included mechanical training, conduct of fire, adjust fire and plotting board.

Additional miscellaneous instruction included individual and general weapons, communications and compass and map reading by instructions at the company level.

An NCO School was organized with instructors, lesson plans and training aids prepared to commence on 1 May.

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SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

✓1.	JOURNAL SUMMARY	PAGE	19
✓2.	BN. FRAG ORDER 7-68	PAGE	27
✓3.	BN. FRAG ORDER 8-68	PAGE	35
✓4.	3/3 AFTER ACTION REPORT	PAGE	41

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JOURNAL SUMMARY APRIL 1968

1 April 1968. At 0840H a message was received from the 9th Marines requesting that all increases and decreases of supporting assets be reported to 9th Marines (Attn S-3) as soon as possible. At 1035H, Company "L" departed to escort tanks to Route #1. At 1550H, a message was received from S-2, 9th Marines that a unidentified enemy element was in the vicinity of YD 210692. Rated B-3. Company "L" returned to A-3 at 1515H. At 2015H, the AN/PPS 5 detected movement but could not determine if it was metallic.

2 April 1968. At 0100H, Company "K" reported movement in front of their lines, it was believed to be an animal. One 4.2mm mortar and 5 enlisted men were chopped from the battalion effective at 1800H 1 April 68. At 0845H, a Company "M" sentinal post returned to the position with a man who had been hurt by a wild boar and fractured his knee. At 1052H, Col. Smith, 9th Marines Regimental Commander arrived on position. Col Smith departed at 1120H. At 1200H, a Company "M" sentinal post sighted 4 NVA moving south at YD 165705. MO checked area with negative results.

At 1800H, the battalion assumed OPCON of Companies "K" and "M" of the 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines.

3 April 1968. At 1015H, civilians were observed at the battalion trash dump. Company "M" sent a detail to disperse them. Col Smith, 9th Marines Regimental Commander arrived on position at 1430H and departed at 1545H. At 1708H, (2) Marines from 3/1 were evacuated to "D" Med, one rat bite and one for medical reasons.

4 April 1968. At 0630H, the Battalion (-) departed to conduct a sweep in accordance with 9th Marines Frag Order #18, (Bn FragO 6-68). Tanks, 106's, 81mm's and dusters remained on position.

At 0950H, an enemy 60mm mortar round was received from an azimuth of 5400 mils at a distance of approximately 1200 meters. An 81mm mortar mission was fired with good target coverage.

At 1000H, Company "I" seized Objective Jill. At 1150H, Company "K" at YD 157694 made contact with approximately eight (8) NVA. Company "K" engaged with M60's, mortars and artillery. An air strike was called. Company "I" swept through the area of contact and captured one NVA pack. At 1228H, Company "K" discovered 3 bunkers at YD 157698. The bunkers were destroyed.

At 1530H, at YD 158695 elements of Company "L" received small arms fire from what was believed to be a bunker complex concealed in heavy vegetation resulting in one USMC, KIA and one Kit Carson Scout WIA. Company "L" moved through the position and captured one NVA radio and a NVA pack. At 1830H, Company "K" at YD 159694 discovered 3 bunkers, the bunkers were destroyed.

5 April 1968. The battalion continues on sweep. Spot reports and sit .

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reports are being submitted to Regimental Headquarters from the field.

At 0800H, elements of Company "L" made contact with six NVA at YD 158696. Company "L" elements engaged the enemy and killed two NVA. At approximately the same time Company "K" observed four NVA in the same general area and engaged with unknown results. The following equipment and weapons were captured.

1 Ammunition belt w/4 mag's	2 ChiCom grenades
1 Gas mask	1 Pair binoculars
1 Canteen	1 First Aid Kit
6 Pounds of rice	1 Wallet w/correspondence
1 Mosquito net	1 Set of Green Khaki clothing
1 AK - 47 Assault rifle	

At 1000H, Company "L" discovered six (6) bunkers, three were caved in and three were in good condition. The following equipment was found in the bunkers:

3 NVA Packs	2 Bags assorted documents
2 Flashlights w/batteries	3 Radio batteries
1 Rope	2 Gas masks
1 Billfold	Toilet articles and sleeping gear

The bunkers were destroyed and the equipment turned into S-2.

At 1445H the battalion crossed phase line blue and moved toward Objective Joyce. At 1830H a Marine from Company "K" accidentally shot himself in the foot with a M-16 rifle. Emergency evacuation was not necessary and the man was Med Evaced the following morning.

At 1900H, Companies "L" and "M" while digging in night positions were engaged with small arms by a NVA unit at YD 171669. Fire was returned and the companies continued to consolidate their positions. An emergency Med Evac was requested for three WIA's and one KIA.

At 2015H, a Company "K" ambush reported movement to their south and north. The movement appeared to be 4 to 5 individuals moving east to west. At 2330H, a Company "L" ambush made contact with a unknown sized enemy force at YD 168678 and engaged with small arms with unknown results.

6 April 1968. At 0001H, a Company "L" ambush engaged an enemy unit and reported one NVA wounded approximately 25 meters from their position. At 0015H, the ambush was heavily engaged and fought their way back to the company perimeter. The Company "L" perimeter received a heavy ground attack, the attack was repulsed. Artillery and 81mm mortar missions were fired on the enemy. Two WIA's were sustained. At 0030H Company "I"'s listening posts sighted two NVA moving north to south.

At 0645H, Company "L" checked the area of the nights contact at YD 168677 and discovered 17 NVA KIA's, 4 wounded PO's and 4 AK-47's 3 SKS's (carbines) and numerous equipment. At 1210H, Company "K" sighted 10 NVA moving west at YD 165655. An artillery mission was fired.

At 1215H, the A-3 Position received two rounds of incoming artillery estimated to be 85mm. At 1355H, an estimated 6 rounds of estimated 85mm incoming was received outside of the A-3 perimeter in the minefield. A sound azimuth indicated the rounds were fired from a distance of

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Enclosure (1)

approximately 3000 meters and 6000 mils. An 81mm mortar mission was fired with unknown results.

At 1400H, Company "L" while on the move to Objective #5 were fired on by ARVN elements and suffered two WIA's. WIA's were Med Evaced.

At 1600H while moving to seize the ground at YD 159651 observed 16 NVA fleeing from the objective to the east. The NVA were pursued by small arms fire, artillery and fixed wing.

At 1850H the battalion received 20 rounds of enemy 60mm mortar fire while consolidating Objective Six. Counter mortar fires were fired by 60mm mortars and artillery. Two KIA's and nine (9) WIA's were sustained. At 1930H 15 more rounds of enemy 60mm mortar fire was received. Fire was returned with 60mm mortars and artillery.

At 2050H, at YD 159651 a company "K" listening post received approximately ten (10) Chi Com Grenades, no casualties were taken. At 2224H, the listening post engaged an estimated twenty (20) NVA with small arms fire. The listening post was recalled and artillery was called in the area of contact. Three (3) friendly WIA's (Non Evac) were sustained.

7 April 1968. At 0800H the area of Company "K" listening posts contact was searched. Blood stains, drag marks, and the following equipment and weapons were discovered;

3 Chi Com Grenades	1 Banana clip magazine
1 AK - 47 rifle	

At 1030H Company "M" found two (2) bicycles at YD 167643. At 1050H, Company "I" observed two (2) NVA moving at YD 163666 in heavy brush. The enemy were engaged by sniper fire with negative results. At 1430H, Company "K" discovered a bunker complex at YD 154656. The bunker complex consisted of 27 bunkers which were destroyed. The following equipment and ordnance were found in the complex;

5 DH - 10 mines	4 Chi Com grenades
5 French anti tank mines	1 RPG - 2 round
400 Rounds machine gun ammunition	2 Machine gun ammunition drums
106 60mm Mortar rounds	3 RPG 7 charges
1 NVA pack	2 Intrenching tools
Several bags of rice	Green and khaki uniforms
Cooking and eating utensils	

At 1645H, Company "K" discovered 100 60mm mortar rounds at YD 150-659. The ammunition was destroyed. At 2055H, a Company "K" listening post sighted an unknown sized enemy force at YD 165658 and engaged with small arms, the enemy withdrew. At 2100H, the battalion at YD 158658 received numerous probes from the north and the west. The probes were supported by 60mm mortars and Chi Com grenades. Listening posts were pulled into the perimeter.

At 2212H, a Company "M", 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines ambush operating from the A-3 Position sighted 4 enemy at YD 168714. The ambush was not triggered due to the enemy not advancing into the killing zone. The enemy withdrew to the southwest.

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8 April 1968. At 0730H, Company "M" secured Objective Diane. At 0930H, civilians were observed at the A-3 trash dump, a detail was sent to order them away.

At 1145H, Lt General Rosson, USA and General Tompkins arrived at the A-3 Position. The Generals departed at 1200H.

At 1600H the battalion operation secured and the battalion entrucked at Cam Lo Bridge for movement to Dong Ha Combat Base.

9 April 1968. At 0755H, Company "M", 3/1 departed A-3 Position and arrived at Route #1 at 0858H. At 1025H, Company "I", 3/3 departed Route #1 for A-3 with the Alpha Command Group following in trace. Company "I" arrived at A-3 at 1135H and Company K, 3/1 departed.

At 1230H, Company "M" and "K", 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines were chopped from OPCON to the 9th Marines.

Company "M", 3/3 departed Route #1 at 1315H. At 1340H, Company "K", 3/1 detonated a mine on Route #1 approximately 1500 meters south of A-2. Seven casualties were sustained and a Med Evac was called. No other details. At 1445H, Company "M", 3/3 arrived at A-3.

10 April 1968. At 1100H a Company "M" sentinel post sighted 20-22 persons at YD 190725 en AO was requested. People are believed to be civilians.

At 1335H, LtCol Marsh arrived at the A-3 Position with a convoy from Dong Ha. Convoy departed A-3 for Dong Ha at 1405H.

11 April 1968. At 1054H, Company "M" discovered at YD 170706 an enemy supply cache containing the following ordnance;

800	Rounds MG Ammo	2	DH-10 mines
1000	Rounds AK-47 ammo	450	82mm mortar rounds w/fuses
400	60mm mortar rounds w/fuses	20	Chi Com Grenades
150	RPG-7 rounds w/fuses		

All ammunition was destroyed with the exception of 2, 60mm, one 82mm two RPG 7 rounds, one box of fuses which were turned into the S-2 section. At 2245H, OP Grey reported sighting a spotlight at 4800 mils, 2000 meters west of the A-3 Position.

12 April 1968. No significant events.

13 April 1968. At 1010H, a Company "I" sentinel post received shrapnel from a TPQ drop. No casualties were sustained.

14 April 1968. At 1237H, Company I made contact with 3 to 4 NVA at YD 198696. Engaged with small arms. At approximately 1300H one Marine received a minor gunshot wound (Non Evac). Company "I" proceeded to check out immediate area to exploit contact. At 1415H, Company "I" discovered fresh fighting holes approximately 3 to 5 hours old. The remains of a claymore mine which was detonated during the contact. Also a DH-10 mine was found. At 1429H Company "I" found a expended link of 25 rounds of Soviet 7.62mm ammunition, one small roll of clay-

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more mine wire and a document. Equipment and document were forwarded to the Regimental S-2.

At 1610H a Marine was sighted by Company "I" walking alone at YD 155696, a helicopter picked up the Marine at 1700H. Marine was believed to be from the 1st Battalion, 4th Marines who had become separated from a patrol.

15 April 1968. No significant events.

16 April 1968. At 0855H, Company "M" elements contact at YD 154701 with what appeared to be a dug in NVA squad. An AO was requested. Company "M" engaged with small arms and deployed to reinforce element in contact. An artillery and 81mm mission was fired. At 0910H the NVA were observed moving northwest from their position at YD 154701. At 0930H, Company "M" while checking out the area of contact found one NVA light machine gun w/ammunition drum, (7.62mm).

At 1400H, Company "M" found 5 empty mortar ammunition boxes and 2 82mm mortar rounds at YD 156698.

Company "M" returned to the A-3 Position at 1830H. The captured weapon and ordnance were turned in to the Regimental S-2.

17 April 1968. At 0125H, OP Silver reported movement but could not give a azimuth. At 0500H, OP Silver reported movement in grid YD 181736, ordered to keep grid under observation.

At 1240H, while on patrol, Company "M" was alerted for possible helicopter lift to reinforce Company "K". A landing zone was selected at YD 205721.

At 1450H a convoy from Dong Ha arrived at A-3. Company "L" returned from Dong Ha and providing security for convoy. The convoy departed the A-3 Position at 1545H.

At 1830H, Company "L" found 3 fresh graves at YD 197712. The graves were opened and 3 adult male bodies were discovered. Bodies were killed by shrapnel. A message from the 9th Marines S-3 was received at 2135H desiring grids for possible air delivery of CS. Grids to be submitted no later than 180630H. S-3, 1-4 Officer and 2-4 Officer notified. At 2330H, grids were sent to the Regimental S-3.

18 April 1968. At 0936H, a message from the 9th Marines S-3 cancelled thrust points due to a compromise.

At 0940H, Company "M" sighted 2 NVA at YD 173744. Company "M" engaged enemy with automatic weapons fire and fired artillery and 4.2 mortar missions with good target coverage. At 1124H a message was received from 1st Battalion, 4th Marines requesting clearance of grid squares 1567 and 1668 for operations. Grid squares were cleared. At 1600H a message was received from the 9th Marines S-3 concerning requests for AO's.

19 April 1968. No significant events.

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20 April 1968. At 0905H, a message from 9th Marines directed that stray animals in mine fields be taken under fire and destroyed, if possible prior to detonating mines.

At 1156H, Company "L" at YD 184735 found two bunkers 4X4 feet, overheaded, approximately 5 months old and at YD 184736 discovered one bunker approximately 2 to 3 weeks old. All bunkers were destroyed. An NVA intrenching tool was also found.

At 1512H, at YD 190723 Company "L" discovered a anti aircraft position consisting of a circular trench with a six foot mound in the center. In the center of the mound a two foot piece of bamboo was mounted. It was believed to be a makeshift mount for an automatic weapon.

21 April 1968. No significant events.

22 April 1968. At 0701H, Company "L" at YD 164707 discovered two bunkers approximately two months old, overheaded, dirt and wood reinforced. The bunkers were destroyed.

At 1015H, Major General Stillwell, USA visited the position. The General departed at 1040H.

At 1153H elements of Company "L" observed 4 NVA moving north at YD 148706. An artillery and 4.2 mortar mission was fired. A search of the area was held and a camouflaged cover and one bag of rice was found. At 1205H, elements of Company "L" sighted 20 to 25 NVA at YD 143707, all armed and with camouflaged packs and green uniforms. AO was on station and an artillery mission was fired with unknown results.

At 2025H, OP Gold observed 6 NVA through a starlight scope in a rice paddy at YD 170736. The NVA were engaged with small arms, artillery and 81mm mortar night defensive fires. Area will be checked out at first light. At 2110H, OP Gold had more suspected movement. At 2233H a Company "I" listening post reported movement to their front, inside the outer wire.

23 April 1968. At 0645H elements of Company "L" at YD 153706 found five (5) 82mm mortar rounds. The rounds were destroyed by demolitions. At 0701H an element of Company "L" while returning to the company patrol base observed 2 NVA at YD 151706 and engaged with small arms fire. The NVA returned fire with small arms and M-79's and then fled to the east. The area was searched with negative results. At 0910H at YD 154704 Company "L" while destroying a bunker suffered one (1) WIA casualty from a secondary explosion. A Med Evac was called and completed at 1015H.

At 1000H a Company "M" OP sighted three (3) NVA at YD 182742. A 106, 81mm mortar and artillery mission was fired with unknown results. At 1910H, two (2) NVA were sighted at YD 183732 by Company "I". Sixty mortar and 90mm mission fired with unknown results.

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24 April 1968. At 0905H, Col Marsh departed to visit Company "K" at the C-2 Position.

At 1100H a Company "M" sentinal post sighted two (2) NVA personnel in the open at YD 183749. An artillery mission was fired with good target coverage. At 1110H, Col Marsh returned to A-3 Position.

At 1240H, Company "M" reported a accidental discharge at their sentinal post position, resulting in (1) Marine being wounded. An emergency Med Evac was requested. Med Evac was completed at 1317H. A serious incident report will be submitted to regiment. At 1445H, the A-3 Position received 20 rounds of enemy artillery fire of a estimated 85mm caliber. The fire was received from an azimuth of 6100 mils. The rounds impacted outside the perimeter at YD 180719.

25 April 1968. At 1930H, small arms fire was received on the south side of the perimeter. A 106mm mission was fired.

26 April 1968. At 0500H, Company "M" departed in accordance with Bn Frag Order 8-68. At 1301 Company "L" discovered two bunkers at YD 194732, bunkers were destroyed.

At 1330H, incoming enemy artillery was observed impacting at YD 194740 and YD 180730. At 1345H, Company "L" destroyed one dud 105mm round at YD 189729. At 1430H, Company "M" returned to A-3.

At 1710H, the battalion was notified by the 9th Marines S-3 to have one (1) company standby for possible employment to Con Thein. Company "L" was placed on alert and secured from standby at 1945H. At 1933H a Company "I" ambush (IA1) at YD 192734 engaged an undetermined number of NVA with small arms and M-79's. At 2020H IA1 reported firing M-79's in the area of contact. The ambush received two Chi Com grenades, one of which was a dud. Area was kept under observation and will be searched at first light.

At 2045H a Company "L" OP sighted approximately 6-8 NVA at a distance of 1000 meters in the vicinity of YD 185731. An artillery mission was fired with unknown results. At 2108H an OP and the battalion lines sighted two groups of 4 to 5 individuals at YD 176723.

27 April 1968. At 0600H, (first light), IA1 searched the area of contact and discovered 1 NVA, KIA and captured the following equipment and weapons;

4 AK magazines w/rounds	3 DH-10 mines
1 Box blasting caps	2 Packs
20 Detonators	3 Chi Com grenades
6 Z-10 mines	1 Flashlight
1 Cartridge belt w/canteen	2 Chi Com holders
2 Boxes AK-47 ammunition	1 Camera
1 Cartridge belt for Chi Coms and magazines	2 Rice bowls
2 Bandages	2 Mosquito Nets
1 Document	2 Hammocks
	Assorted civilian clothing

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1 Empty Can

1 AK-47 rifle

All gear was forwarded to the Regimental S-2. At 1330H, General Krulak arrived at the A-3 Position to present awards to members of the battalion. The General departed at 1500H. At 1537H a convoy from Dong Ha arrived on the position. The convoy departed at 1610H.

28 April 1968. At 0930H OP Gold observed two (2) persons in civilian clothing at YD 166739. An 81mm mortar mission was fired with good target coverage. At 1115H, a Company "I" sentinal post sighted an individual at YD 187709. The person was carrying a rifle.

29 April 1968. No significant events.

30 April 1968. At 1335H, OP Gold sighted tube flashes at a distance of approximately 2500 meters and a azimuth of 5400 mils. An artillery and 81mm mortar mission was fired with unknown results.

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HEADQUARTERS
 3d Battalion, 3d Marines
 3d Marine Division (Rein) FMP
 FPO, San Francisco, California 96602

Copy ___ of ___ Copies
 3d Bn, 3d Mar
 A-3 Position
 2 April 68

Frag Order 7-68

Map: Vietnam 1:50,000 AMS Series L7014, Sheets 6442IV and 6442III.

Time Zone: H

Task Organization.

Company "I" (Rein)

Capt. O.J. LEHRACK

FO Team, "C" Btry, 1/12
 FO Team, 81mm Mortar Platoon
 Dog Team, 3rd MP Bn.
 Sniper Team, Hq. Co. 9th Marines
 FAC/TACP Team
 Engineer Team, "C" Co., 3rd Engineer Bn.
 HST Team, 3rd Shore Party Bn.

Company "K" (Rein)

Capt. D.R. FRANK

FO Team, "C" Btry, 1/12
 FO Team, 81mm Mortar Platoon
 Dog Team, 3rd MP Bn.
 Sniper Team, Hq. Co., 9th Marines
 FAC/TACP Team
 Engineer Detachment, "C" Co., 3rd Engineer Bn.

Company "M" (Rein)

Capt W.H. MCADAMS

FO Team, "C" Btry, 1/12
 FO Team, 81mm Mortar Platoon
 Sniper Team, Hq. Co., 9th Marines
 HST Team, "C" Co. 3rd Shore Party Bn.
 FAC/TACP Team
 Engineer Detachment, "C" Co, 3rd Engineer Bn.

Company "L" (Rein)

Capt. F.R. MATTHEWS

FO Team, "C" Btry, 1/12
 FO Team, 81mm Mortar Platoon
 Sniper Team, Hq. Co., 9th Marines
 FAC/TACP Team
 Engineer Detachment, "C" Co. 3rd Engineer Bn.

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Orientation - Refer to Operation Overlay Annex (A) (See 3rd Mar. Div. Operation Overlay 18-68.

1. Situation.

a. Enemy Forces.

- (1) See Current INSUMS.
- (2) See Annex (B) Enemy Situation overlay.

b. Friendly Forces.

(1) Operation Kentucky continues and the 9th Marines AO remains the same.

(a) The 9th Marines will employ one (1) battalion to clear the area between longitudinal grid lines 15 to 17 from the Phu An area to the Cam Lo River. Task Force Robbie will be in a blocking position north of the French Road in the Cam Lo area. 1st Bn, 4th Marines and the 3rd Bn, 4th Marines will block likely avenues of egress from the zone of action west toward MSR 561.

The 2nd ARVN Regiment will employ two battalions in clearing the area south of the 3/3 AO between the 17 grid line to Route #1, south to the vicinity of the 63 grid line. A composite total of five (5) direct support artillery batteries and two (2) Whiskey Batteries will be in general support of the battalion. Responsive air support can be anticipated. An arc light will be delivered at H-4 on D-Day in the vicinity of the 1666 and 1667 grids.

c. Attachments and Detachments.

- (1) See Task Organization.

d. Artillery.

- (1) Annex C

2. Mission.

a. Conduct an intensive search and destroy operation on a 2000 meter frontage from the west, from the 17 grid line from An Phu to the 65 grid line.

b. Place maximum emphasis on the destruction of enemy positions and emplacements encountered.

3. Execution.

- a. Concept of operations.

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(1) Move with one (1) company at H Hour from the A-3 Position to seize Objective #1 and establish a blocking position to cover the movement of the remaining companies.

(2) At H Hour + 1 move with one (1) company (rein) along assigned Route of advance to secure Objective #2 and support seizure of Objective #3.

(3) One (1) company (rein) will secure Objective #3 supported by a company (rein) from Objective #2.

(4) One (1) company (rein) will seize and consolidate Objective #4.

(5) A battalion (-) night defensive position will be established on Objective #3. One (1) company (rein) will consolidate and defend Objective #4.

b. Company "M".

(1) Move from A-3 at H-Hour and establish a blocking position on Objective #1 to cover movement of the remaining companies across the open paddy area at YD 168712. Be prepared on order to move from Objective #1 to Objective #3 and defend the northern sector of Objective #3.

c. Company "I".

(1) Move from the A-3 Position at about H + 45 minutes along the assigned route of advance to seize Objective Jill and continue the attack to seize Objective #2, on order. From this position be prepared to support by fire or reinforce the seizure of Objective #3 by Company "K". On order, move forward to objective and assume the mission of Battalion Reserve by occupying position on the inner perimeter of the battalion defensive position. Be prepared to furnish ambushes at YD 149681 and YD 154677 to be in position prior to last light.

d. Company "K".

(1) Move in trace of Company "I" to Objective #2. Upon Company "I"'s seizure of Objective #2, move around the western flank of Company "I" and continue the attack to seize Objective #3. Upon seizure of Objective #3 consolidate and be prepared to defend the southern sector of the battalion defensive position. On order be prepared to furnish a platoon size security patrol to uncover patrol Objective YD 153673.

e. Company "L".

(1) Move in trace of Company "K" to the release point established at YD 160703 and continue the attack to seize Objective #4. Consolidate and defend Objective #4 in a company strongpoint type defense. Furnish one (1) reinforced squad ambush at YD 168683.

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f. 81mm Mortar Platoon.

(1) Be prepared to support by fire the movement of the battalion to the 69 grid line. 81 Platoon Commander will move with Command Group "A".

g. Company "K" and Company "M", 3/1.

(1) Companies "K" and "M", 3rd Bn, 1st Marines will man the A-3 Defensive Position in accordance with the fire plan sketch and instructions received from the Battalion Executive Officer.

h. Coordination Instructions.

- (1) D-Day 4 April 68
- (2) H-Hour 0530H
- (3) Line of Departure: South edge of trace west of the A-3 Position.
- (4) Emphasize the probability of encountering booby traps along obvious access routes.
- (5) Submit position reports when moving every $\frac{1}{2}$ hour and situation reports every hour on the half hour.
- (6) Reference Points: Countries 1865, States 1870, Ships 1668, Types of Wood 1664.
- (7) Fighting holes will be dug at each permanent position.
- (8) Destroy all bunkers and emplacements encountered.
- (9) Stress camouflage and fire discipline.
- (10) Keep a detailed list of all enemy equipment captured or destroyed.
- (11) Be prepared to mark lines with air panels or smoke and to mark with 3.5 RKT or 60mm, WP.
- (12) Brief all hands on friendly positions.
- (13) Consider the possible use of flamethrowers and CS, smoke, and demolition charges if bunkers are encountered.
- (14) Unless otherwise announced be prepared to move without delay each morning.
- (15) Normal security will include 331/3% with one (1) IP furnished per platoon perimeter, 100-200 meters forward of friendly lines. Ambushes will normally be furnished from the reserve company.
- (16) Use frequent security halts and place maximum emphasis on standard land navigation techniques.

4. Administration and Logistics.

- a. The following equipment and ammunition are prescribed;
 - (1) Normal arms and equipment.
 - (2) Third canteen is optional.
 - (3) One machete per squad.

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- (4) One complete demolition and pry bag per squad.
 - (5) Five (5) MCI per man
 - (6) One full capsule of salt tablets. per man.
 - (7) One bottle of halizone per two individuals.
 - (8) One change of socks per individual.
 - (9) Two, E-8 Gas launchers per company.
 - (10) 1600 rounds, per M-60 Machine Gun.
 - (11) 366 rounds of 5.56 per rifleman.
 - (12) Four Frag grenades per individual.
 - (13) One CS grenade per individual.
 - (14) Four claymore mines per squad.
 - (15) One air panel per fire team.
 - (16) 150 rounds of 60mm per rifle company.
 - (17) LAAW's, minimum of 6 per squad.
 - (18) 12 collapsable stretchers
 - (19) Approximately 1/3 mile of comm wire per company.
- b. Ensure Med Evacs are recorded properly and that weapons and 782 gear is recorded from casualties prior to completing evacuation.
- c. Regular resupply of Class I and IV is scheduled for the afternoon of D+2.

5. Command and Communications.

- a. The Alpha Command Group will move with Company "K".
- b. The Bravo Command Group will move with Company "I".
- c. Primary means of communications in the defense will be wire.

J. W. MARSH
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Commanding


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ANNEX "A" TO BN FRAG ORDER 7-68 (OPERATION OVERLAY)



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MAJOR, USMC
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


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LIEUTENANT COLONEL, U.S. MARINE CORP
COMMANDING

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ANNEX "B" (INTELLIGENCE) TO BN FRAG ORDER 7-68



- BUNKER
- NVA
- MORT AR/ARTY/ROCKET

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


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ANNEX "C" (ARTILLERY OVERLAY)



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LIEUTENANT COLONEL, U. S. MARINE CORPS
COMMANDING

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MAJOR, US MARINE CORPS
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HEADQUARTERS
 3d Battalion, 3d Marines
 3d Marine Division (Rein) FMP
 FPO San Francisco, California 96602

Copy ___ of ___ Copies
 3d Bn, 3d Mar
 A-3 Position.
 24 April 68

Frag Order 8-68

Map: Vietnam 1:50,000 AMS Series L7014, Sheets 6442 IV and 6442 III.

Time Zone: H

Task Organization.

Company "M" (Rein)
 FO Team, "C" Btry, 1/12
 FO Team, 81mm Mortar Platoon
 One Scout Dog Team, 3d MP Battalion
 FAC/TACP Team
 S-2 Scout
 Detachment, "C" Co., 3d Engineer Bn.

Capt. W.H. MCADAMS

Company "L" (Rein)
 FO Team, "C" Btry, 1/12
 FO Team, 81mm Mortar Platoon
 One Scout Dog Team, 3d MP Battalion
 FAC/TACP Team
 S-2 Scout
 ARVN Interpreter
 Detachment, "C" Co., 3d Engineer Bn.

Capt. F. R. MATTHEWS

1. Situation.

a. Enemy Forces.

(1) See current INSUMS
 (2) Increased enemy sightings from both air and ground indicate NVA forces are moving in small groups in the vicinity of Hill #31 to the northeast of A-3. AO's have also observed what appears to be small NVA elements moving amongst civilians in proximity to the railroad tracks in the 1974 grid square.

b. Friendly Forces.

(1) Operation Kentucky continues and the 9th Marines AO remains the same.

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(2) The 1st Battalion, 4th Marines continues operations to the west of the 15 grid line from the A-4 Position.

(3) The 1st Battalion, 2nd ARVN continues to operate from the A-2 Position. The AO boundry has been extended to include all areas west of the 21 grid line.

(4) Whiskey Battery (-), 1st Bn, 12th Marines will fire in direct support from the A-3 Position. Supporting fires will be in accordance with Annex "B" (Fire Support Plan).

c. Attachments and Detachments.

(1) Remains the same.

(2) See Task Organization.

2. Mission.

a. D-1

(1) Secure a Patrol Base at YD 188733 and conduct platoon size night ambushes at YD 185735 and YD 190738 prior to last light.

(2) Seize Objectives #1 at YD 197746 and #2 at YD 189747 with one reinforced company each and conduct daylight ambushes from these locations.

3. Execution.

a. Concept of Operations.

(1) On D-1 day at 0700H conduct a recon patrol in the vicinity of Tan Lich, establish an OP and maintain observation over D-1 ambush site with one squad.

(2) On D-1 at 1730H move with one (1) company along assigned route and establish a Patrol Base at Tan Lich and deploy two platoon size ambushes in the vicinity of YD 185735 and YD 190738.

(3) At H-Hour commence night movement from the Tan Lich Patrol Base linking up with the ambush patrol and proceed to conduct a first light attack on Objective #1.


(4) Move with one (1) company from Hill #28 at H-Hour to be in position to conduct an attack on Objective #2.

(5) Conduct aggressive patrols from Patrol Bases established on assigned objective.

b. Company "L".

(1) Position one (1) squad employing stealth in the vicinity of Tan Lich at YD 188732. This element will be prepared to recon and make recommendations for the establishment of a company base and will further observe the area designated for night ambush positions. At

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1730H the remainder of the company will conduct a tactical movement from A-3 dropping a platoon size ambush force at YD 185735. Move to the assigned patrol base and from this position deploy a second platoon ambush force to the water point at YD 190730. Ambushes will move to objective areas with only the number of forces required to cover the killing zones. The remainder of forces will be employed as security to give early warning, block access to killing zone and to secure the platoon Patrol Base.

At H-Hour conduct a tactical movement under the cover of darkness to the vicinity of the railroad tracks west of the objective effect deployment from this position and be prepared to seize and consolidate objective at first light. Deploy daylight ambushes from Objective #1 as rapidly as possible making maximum use of available cover and concealment and conduct a detailed search of the subject area. Be prepared to return to the A-3 Position on order.

c. Company "M".

(1) At H-Hour move from Hill #28 after ensuring lines are adequately manned by personnel of Company I to the west side of the stream bed at YD 178737. Effect initial deployment and be prepared to follow heavy prep fires in a dawn attack on Objective #2. On seizure of Objective #2, consolidate a patrol base and making maximum use of cover and concealment establish daylight ambushes in proximity to YD 193747.

d. Company "I". (Battalion Reserve)

(1) Be prepared to furnish one platoon as security for the tank platoon to support and/or reinforce either company in the event contact is gained. Man Hill #28 with one (1) platoon and be prepared to direct the employment of tanks and 106's from the OP's of the Hill #28 perimeter if required.

e. Tank Platoon.

(1) Be prepared to support attack by fire or move from the position to participate in a tank infantry attack on order.

f. Coordinating Instructions.

- (1) H-Hour - 0500H
- (2) LD on D-Day
 - (a) Hill #28, Company M
 - (b) Eastern ambush position, Company L.
- (3) Reference Points.
 - (a) Leg Anatomy - 1770
 - (b) Months - 1975

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- (4) Make maximum use of security elements to secure initial axis of advance and guides for night movement.
- (5) Emphasize stealth and camouflage and use maximum cover and concealment in establishing daylight ambushes.
- (6) Illumination will be fired by the 81mm Mortar Platoon for assist in night movement if required.
- (7) Ensure all personnel are accounted for prior to each move.
- (8) Be prepared to make maximum use of CS and LAAW's.
- (9) Only the patrol bases and static positions will be dug in.
- (10) Ensure all Machine guns have tripod mounts.
- (11) All air support to include AO's will be requested through the 7-4 actual.

4. Administration and Logistics.

- a. Personnel to act as stretcher bearers, ammunition carriers may be requested from the 106RR and 81mm Mortar Platoons.
- b. Med Evacs will be requested only when a major point of contact has been secured.
- c. Not less than 2 filled canteens will be carried.
- d. Normal arms and equipment to include a BA of ammunition will be carried by all personnel.

5. Command and Communications.

- (1) The Command Group will move with Company "M".

J. W. MARSH
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Commanding

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
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ANNEX "A" TO BN FRAG ORDER 8-68

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J. W. MARSH
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Commanding

Enclosure (1)

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 1900 26 April 1800 24 April 68
 Pick up (800 25 April 68
 R.F. FINDLAY JR.
 Major, USMC
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ANNEX "B" TO BN FRAG ORDER 8-68 (FIRE SUPPORT PLAN)

ON CALLS:

HW 64809Z	190758	Illumination
BX 3371 Z	198748	Illumination
BX 3372	185734	Fighting Holes
BX 3359	189737	Fighting Holes
BX 3360	194740	Fighting Holes
BX 3361	178746	Fighting Holes
BX 3362	185750	Mortar Sites
BX 3363	194751	Mortar Sites
BX 3364	197752	Avenue of Approach
BX 3365	198751	Avenue of Approach
BX 3366	198758	Avenue of Approach
BX 3454	198742	Fighting Holes
BX 3455	196744	Bunker & Trench
BX 3456	192745	Fighting Holes
BX 3457	197746	Trench Line
BX 3458	194748	Fighting Holes
BX 3459	198749	Fighting Holes

PREP FIRES:

BX 3373	188746
BX 3367	189745
BX 3368	188748
BX 3369	190749
HW 64810	180747
HW 64811	182749
HW 64812	185750

81's PREP FIRE

188747
189749
186750

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HEADQUARTERS
 3d Battalion, 3d Marines
 3d Marine Division, (Rein) FMF
 FPO San Francisco, Calif 96602

3100.1D
 JWM/jjm
 12 April 1968

From: Commanding Officer
 To: Commanding General, 3d Marine Division
 Via: Commanding Officer, 9th Marine Regiment

Subj: Combat Operations After Action Report

Ref: (a) Division Order 3100.1D
 (b) Frag Order 9-68 (Phase II Task Force Kilo)
 (c) Frag Order 18 (Operation Kentucky)

1. Code Name. Phase 4 Task Force Kilo, Operation Kentucky. (Code Name not assigned).

2. Dates of Operation. 040900H - 081500H

3. Location. Quang Tri Province, Gio Linh Subsector, area bounded by upper left GL 1571, upper right GL 1771, lower left GL 1562, lower right GL 1762.

4. Task Organization.

3d Battalion, 3d Marines, 3d Marine Division FMF

2 Helicopter Support Teams. Company "C" 3d Shore Party Battalion.

3 Scout Sniper Teams, Headquarters Company, 9th Marine Regiment.

2 Scout Dogs, H&S Company, 3d MP Battalion.

4 FO Teams, Battery "C", 1st Battalion, 12th Marines.

3 Interpreters, Headquarters, III MAF.

Combat Engineer Detachment, Company "C", 3d Engineer Battalion.

5. Supporting Forces.

a. Air Support.

(1) 4 April 1968

- (a) Lovebug 514, controlled by Southern Oscar, BDA-3 bunkers destroyed and 7 damaged at YD 158687.
- (b) Hellborne 515, Controlled by Southern Oscar, BDA-2 bunkers destroyed at YD 153693.
- (c) Seaworthy 41-42 and 44-45, controlled by Southern Delta at YD 153692.

(2) 5 April 1968

- (a) Negative Air Support.

(3) 6 April 1968

- (a) Hellborne 516, controlled by Catkiller 10 at YD 172662, negative BDA.
- (b) Lovebug 530, controlled by Catkiller 48, BDA-1 mortar position and 6 fighting holes destroyed. 1 secondary explosion.
- (c) Lovebug 535, controlled by Catkiller 48, BDA-5 bunkers destroyed at YD 163650.

(4) 7 April 1968

- (a) Combat 103, controlled by American Beauty Golf, BDA-4 fighting holes and 1 LA position destroyed.

b. Artillery Support. Emphasis on this operation was placed on adjusted missions, both preparatory and targets of opportunity.

(1) 4 April 1968.

- (a) Preparatory fires were fired using on calls.
- (b) Targets of opportunity included NVA in the open at YD 158697. Mission was fired by Whiskey Batteries 1st Bn, 12 Mar, 2nd Bn, 12 Mar and 3d Bn 3d Mar. with excellent coverage.
- (c) Preparatory were fired on a bunker complex at YD 163696. by Whiskey Battery, 1st Bn, 12th Marines.
- (d) Night Defensive Fires were fired by Whiskey Battery, 1st Bn, 12th Marines and the 2nd Bn, 12th Marines.

(2) 5 April 1968

- (a) Preparatory fires were fired on a bunker complex at YD 163696 by W Battery, 1st Bn, 12th Marines.
- (b) Scheduled preps were fired by 2nd Bn, 12th Marines on

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grids 1567 and 1667. The mission was originated by the 9th Marines in coordination with the 12th Marines.

(c) Adjusted preps were fired the rest of the day by "E", "F", and Battery "D", 2nd Bn, 12th Marines in the vicinity of grids 1567 and 1667 until the night position was secured.

(d) Night Defensive Fires were used extensively. Company "L" was probed in force, while the remainder of the was probed and movement noted on all sides. Missions were fired through the night with five missions going simultaneously all danger close within 200 meters. Reaction was outstanding, volume of fire was heavy, most missions were a battery 1. Support was provided by the 2nd Bn, 12th Marines, "W" Battery, 1st Bn, 12th Marines, "K" Battery 4th Bn, 13th Marines, and "C" Battery, 1st Bn, 40th Artillery, USA. While it was impossible to determine how many of the seventeen (17) NVA confirmed, found the next day were killed by artillery it is felt by this command that artillery was instrumental in killing many and turning back the main force. The support received was adequate in every regard.

(3) 6 April 1968

(a) Heavy preps (Battalion 2) were delivered on five (5) targets in the vicinity of grids 1565 and 1665 just prior to H-hour.

(b) Targets of opportunity included bunkers at YD 163650, on NVA in the open at YD 169654, the mission was fired by Battery "F" 2nd Bn, 12th Marines with excellent target coverage. Prep fires were adjusted on danger areas. Speed and accuracy noted.

(c) On arrival at the night position the battalion received incoming mortar fire, counter battery missions were fired in grid 1664 however, target location was difficult and the A.O. on station caused a check fire. Missions were later adjusted on the same target with good coverage but with unknown results.

(d) Night Defensive Fires were adjusted in. The night activities noted movement and night defensive fires were shot and observed as being on target. The activity thought the artillery had killed some NVA however, a search of the area could not confirm this.

(4) 7 April 1968

(a) No scheduled preps were used, however preps were adjusted.

(b) Targets of opportunity included NVA in the open at YD

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160670, the mission was fired by Battery "F" 2nd Bn, 12th Marines with excellent target coverage.

- (c) Rapid, accurate adjustments and heavy volumes of fire were delivered throughout the day.
- (d) Night Defensive Fires were adjusted in.
- (e) The night activities again noted movement and defensive fires were fired with good coverage but with unknown results. NDF were fired throughout the night.

(5) 8 April 1968

- (a) No scheduled preps were fired, however the adjusted preps in grids 1563 and 1663 were hit with battalion 1's and gave excellent target coverage. It would seem this is the most effective type of preparatory fires since the commander on the ground can put the preps where he wants on the ground rather than relying on map inspection.
- (b) Blocking fires were fired by the last elements leaving the night position. The operation secured on the afternoon of 8 April 1968.

Throughout the operation this command was thoroughly impressed with the artillery support. It was the fastest, most accurate and plentiful artillery support received by this battalion to date. On the night of 5 April 1968 over 400 rounds of 105 and 4.2 were fired in support of Company "L" along with other missions also being shot in support of other units. Throughout the entire operation more than 2200 rounds were expended.

Units Providing Support.

105mm Battery "D" 2nd Battalion, 12th Marines
 Battery "E" 2nd Battalion, 12th Marines
 Battery "F" 2nd Battalion, 12th Marines
 Battery "C" 1st Battalion, 40th Artillery USA

4.2 Mortars. Battery "W" 1st Battalion, 12th Marines
 Battery "W" 2nd, Battalion 12th Marines

155mm Battery "K" 4th Battalion 13th Marines

6. Intelligence. Prior to the operation, large units were reported operating in the area. Agent reports indicated that these were storage areas as well as staging areas secured by units ranging from company size to battalion size. The Order of Battle carried the 48th Regiment of the 320th Division operating in the area. There were also reports of

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a new 27th Regiment located in the Gio Linh area. During the operation there was no indications of any large size force in the area. Contact was made several times with groups of four or five men which appeared to be transportation units. Four (4) POWs were captured by Company "L" at YD 168674 following an engagement of the previous night. During preliminary interrogation the POWs stated they were from several different units with various missions. One POW reported being from the 37th Regiment, 22nd Division, with the mission of carrying food and ammunition. Another POW was in a transportation unit from the 25th Regiment. The third of the POWs was with the 27th Independent Regiment also with the mission of transporting food and ammunition. Serious wounds prevented any preliminary interrogation of the fourth POW.

The terrain and vegetation covered during the operation was generally rough and fairly hard to move on except along the trails. The streams that are shown on the map are accurate. There was always plenty of water and during the hottest, driest part of the summer there should still be sufficient water. Due to the thick underbrush in much of the area we were often forced to cut a trail through the brush. During hot weather this could cause a serious heat problem for a unit carrying heavy loads.

During the rainy season tracked vehicles would have a hard time moving through the rice paddies. During the summer tracked vehicles would have very little trouble moving through the area.

The only real obstacles now are the steep banks along the river beds. The river running through grids 1567 and 1667 was not very deep or wide but the banks on both sides were very steep, they were hard for the troops to move across and would be impossible for tracked vehicles. The same is true for the river in the upper half of grid 1666.

The maps of the area are accurate. The 1:25,000 Pioto Map proved to be helpful in double checking position reports. Navigation became a problem in the area of grid squares 1565, 1665, 1566, and 1666 due to the lack of real identifiable terrain features. The brush was very thick and approximately 12 feet high which made it almost impossible to view surrounding terrain and orient yourself.

The rate of movement in grid squares 1563, 1564, 1663, 1664, 1562, 1561, 1571, 1671, 1570, and 1670 would be at the patrol leaders discretion depending upon the temperature and the amount of gear the troops are carrying. In grids 1569, 1568, and 1668 the rate of movement is about 1000 meters an hour. In grids 1567, 1667, 1566, 1666, 1565, and 1665 the rate of movement is about 500 meters per hour.

The following is a brief description of the vegetation and terrain by grid square.

1571, 1671. Low rolling hills with sparse vegetation characterized by easy movement. The area is potted with numerous bomb craters. A few areas have thick vegetation but it is broken up by bomb craters.

1570, 1670. Low rolling hills with rice paddies in the low areas. The paddies are not very wet during the summer. The high ground has a few trees but has mostly intermittingly sparse to this underbrush.

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There are a few old villages which contain hedgerows.

1568, 1569, 1669. On the hill tops there are trees which form a single canopy about 20 feet high and thick underbrush. The hillsides have grass approximately 4 feet high while the low ground contains rice paddies.

1565, 1567, 1665, 1667, 1566, 1666. These six grid squares contain low rolling hills which are covered with extremely thick brush, the brush is approximately 12 feet high and has very few openings, the movement in these grids is generally very hard.

1564, 1664, 1563, 1663. The movement is good in these grids, the ground is covered with shrubs that are from 1 to 5 feet high. There is nothing to slow movement and there are several good trails in the area.

1561, 1661. These two grids are covered almost entirely with rice paddies.

7. Mission. The mission assigned by reference (b) and (c) was as follows:

1. Attack at 040777Z April 1968 and seize Objective Jill and continue the attack to seize Dottie, Joyce and Diane on order.

2. Conduct a deliberate search of the zone of action and destroy all enemy installations in the zone of action.

3. Provide a Liaison Team to the 2nd ARVN Regiment.

8. Concept of Operation.

a. Background. On D-Day at first light Company "L" was to move from Hill 28 to seize Battalion Objective #1 which provided a commanding position from which to cover the movement of the remaining companies along the assigned avenue of approach toward Objective Jill and Battalion Objective 4. Company "I" was to seize Objective Jill following in trace by Company "K". Upon seizure of Objective Jill, Company "K" was to pass thru elements of Company "L" and seize Battalion Objective 2 followed in trace by Company "I".

Upon seizure of Objective Jill Company "K" and "I" observed approximately 8 NVA moving at 156655. Both companies engaged by fire and Company "I" was ordered forward from Objective Jill to check out the area of contact and continue as ordered to seize Battalion Objective #2. Company "K" was directed to initially support Company "I" by fire and subsequently to move in trace on order to pass through Company "I" and continued the attack to seize Objective Dottie. Company "L" was directed to continue on to seize Objective #4 as planned.

Company I experienced heavy vegetation and irregular to rain which substantially reduced the anticipated rate of movement and held up the

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unit following in trace. Company "L"s navigational errors caused them to offset a substantial distance to the west. While correcting Company "L" made contact with scattered NVA snipers firing from well concealed bunkers at about YD 158696. Company "K" and "L" were deployed to search the area of contact. A three Company perimeter was established at 157694 rather than continuing, in order to exploit the remaining daylight hours to establish a defensive position. Company "I" had continued to push forward to seize and consolidate Objective 2. Company "I" was directed to hold in position and establish a strong point defense until first light. Prior to moving from the night position the following morning Companies "L", "M", and "K" once again observed NVA moving in proximity to the battalion perimeter. The NVA were engaged and the companies resumed the attack from the perimeter to carry out the mission assigned in Frag Order 6-68. Shortly after noon Company "K" passed through Company "I" followed in trace by Company "M" and had seized Objective Dottie. Company "L" moving along the eastern boundary had seized Objective #4. The order to continue the attack was issued at this point to the rifle company commanders.

Orientation.

Battalion Objective #5 is located at YD 166667. Objective Diane is located on Hill #45 1300 meters to our south.

1. Situation.

- a. Enemy Forces- Remains the same
- b. Friendly Forces-
 - (1) The 1st Battalion, 2nd ARVN Regiment has experienced moderate contact on our left flank but has continued to push forward and is in the process of conducting a coordinated Tank-Infantry attack on Objective Jan.
- c. Attachments and detachments remain the same.

2. Mission. Continue the attack at H-hour to seize Objective #5 and Objective Joyce.

3. Execution.

- a. Concept of Operations.
 1. Seize Objective #5 with one company followed in trace by a second company.
 2. Seize and consolidate Objective Joyce followed in trace by a second company.
 3. Consolidate defensive positions with two companies on each of the assigned objectives.
- b. Company "M" Pass through Company "L" on Objective #4 and continue the attack to seize Objective #5. Use Company "L"s FFP as an LOD. On arrival at Objective #5 conduct a recon of the area to determine defensible terrain and man the southern portion of a two company perimeter as directed by the Commanding Officer of Company "L". Establish an ambush at approximately 167668. Make

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- of Company "L". Establish an ambush at approximately 167668. Make liason with Company "L" when passing through Objective #4.
- c. Company "K". Continue the attack at H-hour to seize and consolidate the northern sector of Objective Joyee. Be alert for defensible terrain enroute, in the event it becomes necessary to establish a night position prior to seizing Objective Joyee. Be prepared to defend the southern sector of a two company perimeter. Be prepared to deploy a squad sized ambush in the stream bed at 153670.
- d. Company "L". Follow in trace of Company "M" and be prepared to reinforce or support the seizure of Objective #5. Upon seizure of Objective #5 be prepared to consolidate and defend the northern sector of a two Company position C.O. Company "L" is assigned as defense coordinator. Furnish an ambush prior to last light along the trail north of the position, and furnish the night location prior to 1800 hours.
- e. Company "I". Follow in trace of Company "K" and be prepared to defend the northern portion of the perimeter as selected by Company "K".
- f. Coordinating Instructions.
1. H-Hour- 1330 on order.
 2. LOD - FFP
 3. Upon establishment of night positions be prepared to furnish security patrols around the position as first priority.
 4. All units be prepared to continue the attack on order.
 5. Submit night defensive fires by 1830 hours.
 6. 50% security on both perimeters.
 7. Make maximum use of scout teams while moving.

4. Administration and Logistics.

1. Resupply except on emergency basis is not anticipated until the afternoon of D+2.

5. Command and Communications.

1. The Alpha Command Group will move with Company "K".
2. The Bravo Command Group will move with Company "I".

Background. The heavy vegetation and heat reduced the rate of movement, consequently neither of the assigned objectives were reached before last light. Company "L" and "M" established a defensive perimeter at 168672, while Company "K" and "I" established positions at 154673. Security patrols dispatched from Company "M" made contact with NVA prior to last light in the vicinity of 170669. Company "L" at approximately 2345 hours made contact with an NVA element of approximately company size which probed the northern perimeter and conducted a limited attack shortly thereafter. A major portion of the following was consumed in searching the area of contact for NVA dead, wounded, POWs and gear. At approximately

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1100 hours on D+2 emergency resupply of Class V, evacuation of wounded, and POW's captured weapons and equipment and a detailed search of the area was completed. The companies continued to move in accordance with Frag Order 7 -66. At such time as Objective Joyce and Battalion Objective #5 were secured all units were directed to push the attack to seize Battalion Objective #6 at YD 163658. Converging routes were assigned by a short Frag Order passed via radio. Company "L" was the first unit to reach Objective #6 and found it defended by approximately 20 NVA. An assault of the position was conducted and the NVA fled in the direction of the ridgeline at YD 168657. Companies "L", "M", and "I" established a Battalion perimeter before dark and Company "K" established a company strong point to the north of the position at about 162659. Three company size patrols were conducted to cover the area bounded by 1567 upper left, 1767 upper right, 1564 lower left and 1764 lower right. On D+4 the Battalion was ordered to leave Battalion Objective #6, seize Objective Diane and move to the entrucking point at the Cam Lo Bridge area for transportation to Dong Ha. The following Frag Order was issued.

Frag Order 8 - 67.

Orientation. Objective Diane is located at YD 159642. Battalion Objective #7 is located at YD 163635.

1. Situation.

- a. Enemy Forces. All units were informed as to the hazards of booby traps located in the vicinity of the Cam Lo Valley area. Special emphasis on the enemy capability to employ rockets and artillery in this area was also emphasized.
- b. Friendly Forces. ARVN units and Task Force Robbie and the 3rd Squadron of the 5th Armored Cavalry have secured from the blocking positions and returned to their home positions.
- c. Attachments and detachments remain the same.

2. Mission. Seize Objectives Diane and Battalion Objective #7 and sweep that portion of the zone in proximity to the assigned axis of advance.

3. Execution.

- a. Concept of Operations. Move with two companies from this position to seize Objective Diane and continue to sweep to the Cam Lo bridge position. Move with two companies at H-Hour + 2 to seize Battalion Objective #7 and continue to Cam Lo bridge position to board vehicles.
- b. Company "L". Move at H - hour to seize Objective Diane and conduct detailed search of the Objective area and axis of advance, proceed to the Cam Lo Bridge area.
- c. Company "I". Follow in trace of Company "M" and be prepared to reinforce and support Company "M" in the seizure of

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Objective Diane, and be prepared to proceed to the Cam Lo entrucking area in trace of Company "K".

d. Company "K". Sweep the assigned area enroute to Objective #7 commencing movement at H +2 on order. Establish a hasty defense on Objective #7 and sweep the adjacent areas for enemy emplacements, weapons and equipment. Move from Objective #7 in trace of Company "I" to the entrucking area on order.

e. Company "L". Move from this position in trace of Company "K", and be prepared to reinforce and/or support the seizure of Objective #7. Form a perimeter around the inner perimeter of this position upon the departure of the rifle companies moving at H - hour from the outer perimeter.

f. Coordinating Instructions. Maintain a 15 meter interval when moving from Objective Diane and Battalion Objective #7. Companies "K" and "L" will act as base companies.

4. Administration and Logistics.

1. Ensure all trash is buried and unused rations punctured and rendered unfit for consumption.
2. Police all areas for anything of value to NVA personnel.
3. Cover all slit trenches.

5. Command and Communications.

1. The Alpha Command group will move with Company "K" and the Bravo Group will move with Company "L".

6. Execution. Contact with enemy elements was not made in securing Battalion Objective #1 and Objective Jill. While Company "I" and Company "K" were consolidating Objective Jill, elements from Company "K" noted several NVA personnel moving to the east at YD 197695. Company "K" did not engage in that the NVA personnel were initially thought to be ARVN. After contacting the Battalion S-3 for confirmation the Company Commander ordered one platoon to move forward and deploy in the event the personnel returned. At about 1150H the NVA apparently sighted Company "I" and moved back to the west in front of Company "K". Company "K" engaged the NVA from a distance of 350 meters with small arms, 60mm mortars, machine guns and M-79s. The NVA fled from the area into heavy vegetation. Air strikes were called on the area of the last sighting as well as artillery fires and at 1345H Company "I" swept the area of contact with negative findings, except for one NVA pack found at the point of contact. Company "I" continued to sweep south from this area to secure Objective #2, Company "K" followed in trace to the point of contact and swept the area again with negative results. At 1530H Company "L" while moving about 150 meters to the west of the point of contact received small arms from what appeared to be well concealed bunkers at YD 159695. An S-2 scout walking with lead elements was killed and a Kit Carson Scout was

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wounded. Shortly after this a platoon from Company "L" discovered a 2 watt radio in good condition with assorted documents and an NVA pack. Company "L" was pulled back from the point of contact and covered the movement of one platoon from Company "K", while they searched the area. Just prior to the entry of Company "K" into the area an AO spotted fresh bunkers near the point from which the sniper fire was received and fixed wing was called to destroy the bunkers. Company "K"s search of the area revealed no evidence of NVA personnel in the area.

Company "I" was instructed to hold their position at Objective #2 while the remainder of the battalion occupied a Battalion (-) size position at YD 157695. Shortly before last light the captured radio and assorted NVA equipment and Marine KIA were evacuated from the area. Prior to returning to the perimeter Company "K" destroyed 3 bunkers at YD 159694. The night of D-day was without further incident.

On D+1 Company "L" at 0700H commenced to sweep the area of the D-day contact while enroute to Objective #4. At 0800H at approximately YD 158696 Company "L" engaged 6 NVA moving west near a trail killing 2. The remainder fled to the west and were engaged by Company "I" and "K" with unknown results. In addition to the two bodies found Company "I" discovered 1 AK-47, 1 pair of 8x30 binoculars, a map, NVA pack and assorted equipment. At approximately 1000H all companies were moving south to their assigned Objectives. At about 1000H on D+1 Company "L" found and destroyed 6 bunkers at 156693 and continued to move to Objective #4. At about 1100H Company "K" passed through Company "I" on Objective #2 and pressed the attack to seize Objective Dettie at 1230H without incidence. Company "L" reported Objective #3 seized at approximately the same time. Movement in these areas was very slow as a result of thickly vegetated areas and broken relief. Battalion Objective #5 was deduced as being vital to covering commanding terrain from which a sweep to the eastern portion of the sector could be made. Company "I" was assigned to secure Objective #5 followed in trace by Company "L". Company "K" was to be followed in trace by Company "I" in the seizure of Objective Dettie. Movement was slow and in order to salvage some daylight to organize defensive positions Companies "L" and "K" were directed to establish night positions somewhat short of Objective #5 at about YD168672. Company "K" also held up short of Objective Dettie at about YD 154675 and was joined at about 1730H - 1800H by Company "I" for consolidation of what was determined to be defensible terrain. Throughout the afternoon reports had been received that the ARVN forces moving to the east had experienced heavy contact in close proximity to the Company "L" and "K" perimeter. Company "I" dispatched security patrols from their position to cover the preparation of their defensive position. At about 1830H Company "K"s security patrol made contact with NVA forces concealed in high grass near the perimeter resulting

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in one Marine KIA and four WIA. The enemy withdrew and darkness set in. NVA elements around both perimeters continued to deliver sporadic small arms fire across both perimeters through the night; and movement was reported on all fronts. At 052330H Company "L" listening post engaged an estimated Company size unit moving south toward their perimeter. The LP was withdrawn and the enemy made two half-hearted probes in force at the perimeter, both attacks failed to penetrate the perimeter and the enemy hastily withdrew under intense small arms and high angle fires. Artillery support was accurate and timely and undoubtedly prevented the enemy from reorganizing in a secure assembly area. Two friendly KIA's were incurred throughout the night. The following morning Company "L" swept the area finding 17 NVA bodies, 4 POW's, 4 AK-47's, 3 SKS and a large amount of enemy gear was uncovered and evacuated on the morning of D+2. The search of the area delayed the departure of all units in continuation of the attack. Once again the battalion moved in two axis with Companies "L" and "M" approaching Objective #6 from the east and Companies "I" and "K" from the west. Company "M" sighted 10 NVA moving west on a ridgeline at YD 061210, Company "M" adjusted several artillery missions. Shortly thereafter Company "L" passed thru Company "M" and resumed the attack. The AO sighted bunkers forward of Company "L" at YD 163658. Air strikes and artillery were called on the bunkers and Company "L" continued to press on to Objective #6. At about 1400H Company "L" incurred 2 casualties from ARVN small arms to the east, Company "L" was the first unit to approach Objective #6, Company "L" received incoming mortars and small arms from the Objective. The Company Commander organized two platoons for an assault on the Objective and after preparing the Objective with artillery fire, drove the NVA from the Objective. While pursuing the withdrawing enemy NVA by fire the Regimental Snipers accounted for two NVA confirmed KIA's.

Once the Objective area had been secured the remaining companies organized a battalion perimeter excluding Company "K" which organized a company strong point at YD 163658. Resupply was received on the objective at about 1600H and at 1815H the NVA delivered 20 well placed 60mm rounds which impacted in the center of the perimeter near the LZ, resulting in 2 KIA's and 9 WIA Med Evacs. The Med Evacs were completed and artillery and air strikes were called in the area from which the mortars were employed. 60mm mortar fire was received again at 1930H with negative casualties.

At about 2050H the Company "K" strong point received probes accompanied by a moderate volume of small arms and chi-cons. A Company "L" listening post reported approximately 20 NVA moving in force toward the position. The LP engaged the enemy element but only 1 KIA could be confirmed. Company "K" sustained 3 WIA's non-evacs while withdrawing the LP. A search of the area the following morning revealed drag marks and blood trails and one AK-47 rifle.

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The following day three company size sweeps were conducted to cover the entire area within a radius of 1500 meters of Objective #6. At about 071050H Company "I" while on patrol observed 2 NVA and engaged the enemy with unknown results. Later during the day Company "K" found a bunker complex at about YD 164656 which was thought to be about a month old, the bunkers were destroyed. At 071640H at about YD 150659 Company "K" discovered 100 60mm mortar rounds and assorted NVA equipment in bunkers. 27 bunkers, 5 DH-10, 4 chi-con, 5 AT mines, 1 RPG launcher and 106 60mm mortar rounds and assorted equipment was destroyed. At 2045H Company "K" and "I" listening posts spotted NVA moving approximately 50-100 meters from the perimeter. The exact number could not be determined. The LP's were withdrawn and the probes continued for the next four hours, probes were accompanied by NVA 60mm mortars, chi-cons and rifle grenades directed at the perimeter. A total of 5 minor WIA's were incurred throughout the night. The enemy made no effort to attack the position in force as they had done on 5 April. The following morning at first light Companies "I" and "M" departed the position by the most direct route to Objective Diane. Two hours later at 080830H Companies "L" and "K" commenced movement to Battalion Objective #7. Upon securing assigned objectives all units proceeded to the French Road paralleling the Cam Lo Valley to the truck turn around adjacent to the C-3 Bridge Position for transportation to Dong Ha.

10. Results.

a. Friendly losses throughout the operation included 4 KIA, 3 NBC Med Evacs, 20 WIA Med Evacs, 13 WIA minor. In addition 1 Kit Carson Scout was hit by small arms and Med Evaced.

b. 22 NVA KIA's were confirmed, 4 POW's were captured and 12 bunkers destroyed.

1. The following enemy weapons and equipment were captured.

- 1 NVA two Watt Radio
- 26 NVA Packs
- 5 AK-47's
- 4 S&S Carbines
- 44 82mm Mortar Rounds
- 189 60mm Mortar Rounds
- 37 Chi-con Grenades
- 9 AK-47 Banana Clips
- 5 DH-10's
- 1 RPG-2 Round
- 400 7.62 Machine Gun Rounds
- 1 Clip, 30 Cal. Rounds
- 5 French AT Mines
- 1 Set 8x30 Binoculars
- 2 Bicycles

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- 4 Radio Batteries
- 1 Wood Saw
- 2 Machine Gun AMMO. DRUMS
- 3 RPG Charges
- 2 Flashlights w/batteries
- 2 Introuching Tools
- 3 Gas Masks
- 2 Billfolds
- 1 Ammunition Belt
- 1 Map
- 100 lbs of Rice
- Various Documents
- Various 702 gear and Uniforms

c. All targets engaged in the AO on or near the axis of advance were searched.

d. One H-16 partially destroyed was found by Company "I" in the vicinity of YD 155688.

11. Administrative Matters

a. Supply.

1. Resupply of ammunition and food was handled by helicopter as it was the only practical means to accomplish the task.

Water was obtained in adequate quantities from the streams in the area. However, hot weather would definitely influence the route and rate movement.

2. A Flame Thrower Section was staged on the LSA for possible employment against bunkers. Although the technique was not put to the test, its success would depend on the immediate availability of helicopters and the ability to secure a landing zone close to the point of contact.

3. The weight of one LAAM versus a 3.5 rocket launcher loaded with an HE round is 4 $\frac{1}{2}$ lbs versus 21.9 lbs. Since the weapons have the same capability, it is advisable to utilize the LAAM in thick terrain during hot weather. Use of the W.P. 3.5 is one advantage that's lost to the LAAM.

Marking of targets can be accomplished with the 60mm mortar but a suitable weapon to provide a smoke screen is not available on the company level. All aspects considered, it was felt that the LAAM was the more suitable weapon of the two for this operation.

b. Maintenance.

1. The Battalion Amorer made several minor repairs in the field. An operating rod and a bolt plug had to be

flown in by helicopter for repair of an M-60 Machine Gun which was accomplished along with normal resupply.

- c. No difficulties were encountered in the treatment or evacuation of casualties.
 - d. Transportation.
 - 1. Movement of troops was accomplished by foot with the exception of the move from Can Lo to Dong Ha. Adequate trucks were provided and no problems were encountered.
 - e. Communications.
 - 1. The 292 antenna less the pole sections was carried to the field. Merely setting the antenna on the ground enabled communications to be maintained. A field expedient would have been utilized if a pole was needed thus reducing the weight carried by the communications section.
 - f. Medical Evaluation.
 - 1. No problems encountered.
12. Special Equipment and Techniques.
- a. A field expedient switch board was tried with no success. Five line packs were connected and wired to the Companies reducing the number of TA-1's required. Unfortunately, positive communications were not established, however, the equipment is being checked to remedy the situation.
13. Commander's Analysis.
- a. Except for the last days of the operation weather was overcast and reasonably cool. Had this not been the case it is felt that many heat casualties would have been incurred in the vicinity of grids 1565, 1566, and 1567. This area is not only broken but the heavy vegetation offers little relief from heat or humidity.
 - b. It was the opinion of all concerned that the NVA experiences a great deal of freedom of movement in this area. There were signs throughout the entire area of operations of enemy movement, but virtually no indication of a significant strong point, heavy weapons site or storage area. The enemy was observed moving during daylight hours on at least 7 occasions. He apparently feels the heavy overgrowth will adequately conceal him from air observation and did not expect to encounter ground forces in the area.
 - c. Little can be said for his tactics in that each engagement of any significance caught him by surprise and at an extreme disadvantage. It appeared that on the evening of 5 April he

attacked the Company "L" position more out of confusion than desire. The artillery block accurately adjusted on his primary withdrawal route obviously had much to do with his reluctance to withdraw. Except for the contact of 5 April it was pretty well substantiated that the NVA currently in the area are spread throughout the area in small units.

d. It would not be possible to sweep the assigned area of the 3d Battalion, 3d Marines AO in a deliberate manner, in less than 10 days. It is not possible in such terrain to displace a unit and search simultaneously. The most successful technique would be to separate the two functions. Move a unit from point to point with good security, establish a patrol base in a lucrative area and conduct a systematic sweep. At such time as the Commander is satisfied he has eliminated all suspected areas, he would then move to another pre selected area and repeat the process.

e. It is important that all units recognize the problem inherent to navigation in this area. Several check points and objectives must be assigned and religiously followed. Canopy and heavy secondary growth prevails in the lower stream bed and defile areas. There are areas extending 300-500 meters with little recognizable change in relief and virtually no recognizable terrain features. It is difficult to estimate time distance factor. Therefore it is wise to be continuously alert to defensible terrain. By keeping these locations in mind if a commander is unable to reach his intended night position because of enemy contact or difficult terrain he can fall back to his last defensible terrain and organize his position before dark.

f. The use of the AO was beneficial but in some cases hindered progress. In some cases an AO tends to "overplay" the situation. This of course is not only the fault of the AO, but also the commander on the ground. For example an AO will point out bunkers in front of a company moving with poor visibility. The Company Commander on too many occasions assumed an extensive bunker complex and unnecessarily delayed his advance firing artillery and requesting air support, only to find his bunker complex when advancing through the area to be an old uncovered Marine fighting hole. Although caution must be exercised in order to exploit an operation of this nature momentum cannot be lost.

g. The operation was considered to be generally successful. It is felt that a major portion of this units success was due to the efforts of the ARVN forces and Task Force Robbie in dislodging the enemy and causing him to seek new positions.

h. If an operation of this type is planned in the future more time

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for deliberate sweeps must be allowed in the areas of difficult terrain. When time is limited a sweep frequently degenerates into a battalion moving on line with companies in column at best. This means each company in the thicker vegetation may cover a front of 50 meters and still be able to move no more than 300 meters an hour.

14. Recommendations.

a. It is felt that the following grids should be kept under observation by recon elements and when not practical subjected to heavy H&I fires and AO scouting.

1. YD 160703 - possible harbor site, and/or station for transportation units.
2. YD 152760 like harbor site and storage area.
3. North, South trail on hill #36 in eastern section of grid YD 1667 and north terminating at YD 152673.
4. Confirmed harbor site and semi-permanent living area located at YD 162662. This area is not fortified but extremely well camouflaged.
5. Intersection of trail and stream at YD 162661.
6. Enemy position located on defensible ground at YD 154566.
7. It is recommended that the PysOps HQ capability be available to broadcast Chu Hoi propaganda immediately following a successful engagement. This would be particularly useful in a situation where friendly units have blocked off enemy avenues of egress following a contact.

DONALD C. MARCHETTE
By direction

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Concept of Operations 4-8 April 1968

